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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-ii 
The opening and responsive briefs filed in this appeal discussed a range of appellate 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. This Reply Brief will address a limited selection of 
claims raised. 1 
I. DUNLAP AGREES THAT STATE LAW BARS MERITS REVIEW OF THE 
UNDERLYING SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES IN HIS IAC ON APPEAL CLAIMS 
In his Appellant's Opening Brief ("Dunlap's Brief'), Dunlap raised an issue regarding 
whether the underlying substantive claims that were the subject of each ineffective assistance of 
counsel ("IAC") on appeal claim may be considered on the merits. Dunlap's Brief at 6. The 
State rephrased this issue as whether the underlying substantive claims were waived because 
they were known or reasonably could have been known on appeal or during the initial post-
conviction proceedings following the resentencing. Brief of Respondent ("State's Brief') at 6. 
The State noted that Dunlap ·'properly conceded his substantive claims were known or 
reasonably could have been known during his first resentencing post-conviction proceedings and 
appeal." Id. at 7. 
The State also noted that the page limit imposed for Dunlap's brief in the prior appeal of 
the resentencing, which Dunlap had offered as an excuse for omitting issues, does not fall within 
any explicit exception ofldaho Code§ 19-2719(5). State's Brief at 7, 10. Dunlap acknowledges 
that is the current state of the law, and he acknowledged it below. See R. 1387 (''Dunlap 
acknowledges that these record-based substantive claims may be barred in state court under§ 19-
2719 in this successive petition .... "). Dunlap merely raised the substantive issues to exhaust 
them in state court and acknowledged they appeared to be barred under§ 19-2719. 
Dunlap discussed the Court-imposed page limitation only as a reason for this Court to 
1 The appellate IAC claims regarding instructional issues are meritorious. Dunlap stands on his 
opening brief regarding those issues and makes no further response. 
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create an exception to § l 9-2719's limits on the merits review of claims in a successive petition. 
See R. 1387, and Dunlap's Brief at 6 ("The only basis or excuse that Dunlap asserts for raising 
them in the successive petition in this case is that appellate counsel was limited on appeal by the 
page limits imposed by this Court.'').2 The State seems to have incorrectly interpreted Dunlap's 
argument - that this Court should relax the waiver provisions of§ 19-2719 based on its 
imposition of page limits as a new and independent due process claim under the federal 
constitution. See State's Brief at 10. 
As the State noted, the Fourteenth Amendment due process objection to this Court's page 
limitation was raised as a defense against summary dismissal and not as a ground for relief in 
Dunlap's petition. See id.; R. 1389. Dunlap did not intend to raise this Court's page limitation 
as an independent constitutional claim in this proceeding or below. Rather, he was merely 
offering it as a basis for avoiding summary dismissal, by explaining the connection between the 
Fourteenth Amendment violation alleged by the SAPD in its moving papers in the prior appeal 
and this Court's equitable power to excuse the waiver of the underlying substantive claims. 
Unless this Court creates an exception tc, the statutory waiver rule based on the page 
limitation, Dunlap acknowledges that the underlying substantive issues in his IAC on appeal 
claims are precluded from review under§ 19-2719. 
2 The State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") previously raised an issue regarding page 
limits when it sought leave to file a 221 page brief on the consolidated appeal of the conviction, 
sentence and denial of post-conviction relief. See Dunlap v. State, ISC #32773, Renewed 
Motion to Permit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 Pages, filed Dec. 21, 2010, at 6-7 (alleging 
both due process and equal protection concerns under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as an 
adverse impact on Dunlap's right to "'adequate and effective appellate review,"' quoting Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 276 (2000)). This Court rejected this argument. See State v. Dunlap, 
ISC #32773, Order Re: Renewed Motion to Pennit Filing of a Brief in Excess of 50 Pages, filed 
Jan. 12, 2012 (grant of motion limited to 100 pages, rather than the full amount requested). 
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II. DUNLAP'S APPELLATE IAC CLAIMS FOR FAILURE TO RAISE 
WITHERSPOON, MORGAN AND TRIAL IAC VOIR DIRE ISSUES ARE 
MERITORIOUS 
Dunlap raised three appellate IAC claims relating to jury selection and composition. 
Specifically, the SAPD failed to raise issues about constitutionally insufficient capital 
qualification of the jury under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), and Morgan v. 
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992), as well as trial counsel's ineffective assistance during an 
inadequate voir dire. Dunlap's Brief at 3, 14. The State argued that the appellate IAC claims fail 
because the "SAPD's tactical decisions'' in omitting these jury selection claims were not 
objectively unreasonable and that the omissions did not prejudice Dunlap because the claims 
would not have prevailed on appeal. State's Brief at 12. The State is incorrect. 
A. The SAPD's Claim Selection Cannot be a Strategic Decision 
In his opening brief, Dunlap argued that the SAPD raised an issue foreclosed by Ross v. 
Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 81 (1988), making it clearly weaker than the issues raised here. See 
general(v Dunlap's Brief at 14-15, 22. Ross held that the right to an impartial jury is not 
impc:cted by the erroneous failure to exclude a member of the venire who shou!d have been 
removed for cause, if subsequently that venireman was removed by a peremptory strike and did 
not actually sit on the jury. Ross, 487 U.S. at 88. 
The State asserted that the SAPD made a strategic decision in raising "a claim regarding 
the disqualification of two other jurors for cause in the consolidated appeal." State's Brief at 22-
23. This is the very claim that Dunlap showed was foreclosed by Ross. See Dunlap's Brief at 
14. The failure to disqualify those two challenged jurors was harmless because they were struck 
by peremptory challenges and did not sit on the jury. See id. 
The State ·'d[id] not concede'' that the issue raised by the SAPD was foreclosed by Ross 
and clearly weaker than the omitted issues. State's Brief at 24. While refusing to concede that 
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the claim was weaker, the State failed to argue that it was not clearly weaker. Most significantly, 
the State failed even to contend that the issue was not foreclosed by Ross. See State's Brief at 22 
(merely stating without citation or argument that the claim raised by SAPD was ·'allegedly 
'foreclosed by Ross"') ( emphasis added); id. at 24 (no argument other than "does not concede" 
issue raised was weaker). 
The State argued that the SAPD's omission of the issues raised by Dunlap in this appeal 
was a tactical, winnowing decision, which this Court will not second guess. Id. at 23-24. 
However, strategic decisions must be supported by reasonable professional judgment, Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984), which this decision clearly was not. Deficient 
performance occurs under the Supreme Court's appellate ineffectiveness test when ''ignored 
issues are clearly stronger than those presented.'' Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259,288 (2000). 
Choosing to raise an issue foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent, to the exclusion of clearly 
stronger issues, is neither reasonable nor strategic. See, e.g., Shaw v. Wilson, 721 F .3d 908, 915-
18 (7th Cir. 2013) (when non-frivolous, stronger issue had "better than a fighting chance,'' 
raising issue that was --hopeless'' and "dead on arrival," was ineffective because '·[ n ]o tactical 
reason ... can be assigned for [his] failure to raise the only substantial claim[] that" defendant 
had). The State's winnowing argument grossly overstated the latitude given to counsel. While 
appellate lawyers need not present every non-frivolous argument, "they are expected to 'select[] 
the most promising issues for review.''" Id. at 915 (emphasis in original) (quoting Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745. 752-53 (1983)). 
In the context of a trial IAC claim, the State acknowledged a "strategic" or '"tactical'' 
decision is unw01ihy of a presumption of competence when the lawyer's decision resulted 
"'from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
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review."' State's Brief at 23 (quoting State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 384, 313 P.3d 1, 40 
(2013) (''Dunlap V'), petition for certiorari filed, no. 13-1315 (Apr. 28, 2014). and its discussion 
of trial IAC claims). The SAPD demonstrated ignorance of the law in challenging venire 
members who were biased in favor of death but did not sit on the jury. This issue was foreclosed 
by Ross. Dunlap's Brief at 14. In ignoring Ross, a controlling Supreme Court case, and in 
raising an issue foreclosed by it, the SAPD performed deficiently3 and raised a clearly weaker 
issue. See Robbins, 528 U.S. at 288. The venire members who did not sit on the jury shared 
biases very similar to juror Canaday, who did in fact sit on the jury and whose empanelment the 
SAPD inexplicably failed to challenge. In failing to challenge both the automatic death penalty 
("ADP'') jurors who did sit on the jury as well as the improper exclusion of juror McMinton in 
violation of Witherspoon, the SAPD omitted clearly stronger issues. 
The State also made a policy argument that appears to urge this Court to reject the 
Robbins test. The State argued that the Robbins "test would result in a 'weak' claim being filed 
in virtually every appeal just to leave open the possibility of an ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel claim in the future:· S:ate's Brief at 24. The State's policy argument is misplaced, 
unnecessary and should be ignored. Aside from its conflict with the United States Supreme 
Court, the State's proposed policy ignores the prejudice prong of the appellate ineffectiveness 
test, i.e., that the unraised issue must offer a reasonable probability of a different result. Mitchell 
v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998) (citing Strickland). The prejudice prong 
will decrease the likelihood of purposeful sandbagging. It is unlikely that any competent 
3 The SAPD's failure to raise a trial IAC issue about the inadequate voir dire that caused the 
Morgan and Witherspoon violations, instead of the issue foreclosed by Ross, was likewise 
ineffective. See infra at 26-28. 
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appellate counsel will purposely omit winning issues while raising clearly weaker ones in the 
hopes of establishing appellate IAC sometime in the future. 
B. Dunlap Raised Appellate IAC Claims Based Upon Witherspoon and Morgan 
in Addition to Trial IAC Relating to the Inadequate Voir Dire 
The State did not clearly address Dunlap's claims that appellate counsel failed to raise 
Wither.spoon and Aforgan claims. See State's Brief at 16. The State devoted the bulk of its 
argument to the appellate IAC claim based upon trial counsel's inadequate voir dire with respect 
to jury qualification. See id. at 16 ("Dunlap contends the SAPD was ineffective on appeal for 
failing to raise trial counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during voir dire"); id. at 24 ("because 
Dunlap's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim involves an ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claim, the appellate counsel claim is wrapped in a double presumption''); id. at 27 
("it must be remembered the claims Dunlap is raising involves the SAPD's failure to raise an 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for alleged inadequacies during voir dire and failing 
to move for removal ofjurors for cause''); id. at 31 (''he has failed to pierce the presumption that 
the decision not to raise these claims was tactical and that the SAPD winnowed out these 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims''); id. at 39 (''It is little wonder the SAPD chose not 
to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based upon A1organ. "). 
Embedded within these arguments were instances when the State obliquely referred to 
Dunlap's appellate IAC claims based upon Morgan and Witherspoon violations. See State's 
Brief at 17 ("Dunlap contended'' McMinton's '·exclusion violated Witherspoon" and that 11 of 
12 seated jurors '·were willing to automatically vote for the death penalty in violation of 
Morgan"); id. at 25 ( discussing lack of prejudice, State asserted McMinton "was properly 
excused under Witherspoon"); id. at 31 ("Dunlap has failed to establish the Morgan claims are 
'clearly stronger than those presented."'). Those responses, however, are buried within the 
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State's discussion of the trial IAC claim throughout its brief, in both the earlier sections 
addressing Morgan and Witherspoon, State's Brief at 16-40, as well as in a later section that 
specifically addressed appellate counsel's failure to raise various aspects of trial counser s 
inadequate voir dire. Id. at 40-43. 
The State characterized Dunlap's arguments about appellate counsel's failure to raise a 
trial IAC claim as "repetitive, perplexing and confusing." Id. at 40. Seemingly, the "repetitive" 
comment reveals that the State viewed the trial IAC issue as the only jury selection issue 
appellate counsel failed to raise. This interpretation seems congruent with the State's discussion 
of appellate counsel's failure to raise a trial IAC claim in all of the jury-related sections of its 
brief. 
Notwithstanding the State's approach, Dunlap raised three distinct appellate IAC claims 
based upon the SAPD's failure to raise: (1) a Witherspoon claim regarding juror McMinton, see 
Dunlap's Brief at 15-23; (2) a Morgan claim regarding juror Canaday and ten other jurors, see id. 
at 23-36: and (3) a trial IAC claim for an inadequate voir dire encompassing failures to question 
and rehabilitate juro,·::, and move to exclude or object to the exclusion of various jurors based or. 
Morgan and TYitherspoon. See id. at 36-43. 
In asserting that the Morgan and Witherspoon claims arise from IAC of appellate counsel 
in failing to raise IAC of trial counsel, the State attempts to have the Court review the claims 
through two levels of deference, based on the presumption that both trial and appellate counsel 
acted strategically. State's Brief at 24-25. But that assertion is misplaced and inapplicable. The 
failure to raise i\llorgan and Witherspoon violations on appeal involves only appellate counsel's 
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decision on issue selection. In contrast, the failure to raise a trial IAC claim might require the 
showing of an unreasonable strategic decision by both trial counsel and appellate counsel.4 
The failure to object at trial does not preclude this Court from considering the claims, 
although it does subject the claims to harmless error review. 5 The Morgan and Witherspoon 
errors address fundamental constitutional rights to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment 
and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 518; Morgan, 504 
U.S. at 729. These errors are not harmless. ·'If even one such [ADP] juror is empaneled and the 
death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 
729. See generally Dunlap's Brief at 23. 
C. Canaday was a Substantially Impaired Juror Under Morgan 
In response to Dunlap's argument that Canaday was a "substantially impaired'' ADP juror 
who sat in violation of Morgan, Dunlap's Brief at 25-27, the State declined to address the most 
troubling aspects of her voir dire testimony that established her impairment. Instead, the State 
urged deference to hypothetical strategic decisions by trial counsel. State's Brief at 27-28. The 
scenarios hypo~:1esized are irrelevant to whether Canaday was substantially impaired. Th-: 
4 As set forth in Dunlap's opening brief and infra at 26-28, however, he has shown that both trial 
and appellate counsel were ineffective. Moreover, there can be no reasonable strategic judgment 
in leaving on the jury someone who is ADP and substantially impaired under Morgan, or in 
failing to challenge that result on appeal. See, e.g.. Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d 453, 463 
( 6th Cir. 2001) (failure to challenge biased juror cannot be a strategic decision, because counsel 
cannot waive defendant's basic Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury and import non-
harmless, structural error into the trial). 
5 As this Comi found last year, "when reviewing a capital sentence we will address all of the 
errors a defendant raises, whether preserved by objection or not.. .. " Dunlap V, 155 Idaho 345, 
362, 313 P .3d at 18 (2013 ). Had the SAPD raised on appeal the issues Dunlap alleges should 
have been raised, each would have been reviewed even if no objection had been made below. 
However, for each such unpreserved issue Dunlap had the burden of proving the error was not 
harmless. Id. at 363, 313 P.3d at 19. 
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State's inability to rebut Dunlap's showing that Canaday was substantially impaired as an ADP 
juror mandates reversal of the district court decision. 
First, the State asserted several excuses to support its argument that trial counsel made a 
"strategic" decision passing Canaday for cause. id. at 27-28. However, those excuses are 
relevant to the trial IAC claim, but not the Morgan claim. 
Second, the hypothesized excuses for trial counsel not moving to exclude Canaday are so 
poorly conceived that they are unreasonable and nonstrategic. For example, the State 
hypothesized that trial counsel likely desired to keep Canaday as a juror because she initially 
expressed an opinion that the State should have to offer "proof to an absolute certainty," and she 
further explained that the evidence should show the defendant "did the crime without doubt."6 
See State's Brief at 27. In the circumstances of this case, that hypothetical argument has no 
basis. This is a resentencing case, and Canaday was informed not only that Dunlap had already 
pied guilty, but also that "two young ladies have died at Tim Dunlap's hands." R. 1794. His 
guilt was already determined beyond all doubt. Keeping a potential juror, because she "has 
expressed an exceptionally strong desire" to h0ld the State to proof of the elements, is not 
strategic when those elements were already definitively established and the juror's sworn 
statements at voir dire and in her questionnaire established her ADP bias. Similarly, Canaday's 
belief that '·[i]nnocent people have been executed," State's Brief at 27, is equally in-elevant to 
this case because Dunlap's guilt was already conclusively established. 
6 This is clearly not the law, and after the prosecutor discussed and clarified Canaday's 
misconception, she understood and agreed to follow the law. R. 1790-91. The State's 
suggestion that trial counsel ·'would have wanted to retain a juror who expressed an 
exceptionally strong desire to have the state prove the elements required for imposition of the 
death penalty,'· State's Brief at 27, makes no sense given Canaday's subsequent assurance that 
"reasonable doubt is appropriate." R. 1791. 
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The State also suggested defense counsel passed Canaday for cause because she would 
not view Dunlap's crime as a brutal one. This proposition is based upon her questionnaire 
answer indicating that watching graphic depictions of the deaths on television had desensitized 
her. See id. at 27; R. 2078. To the extent Canaday's beliefs about the level of brutality could 
come into play, it would tend to impact the aggravating factor of an especially heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel murder, see LC. § 19-2515(9)( e ), an aggravator that was not presented to the 
jury. If, instead, the questionnaire statement was taken as a general comment, it falls short of a 
strategic reason to retain an ADP juror. Television and movies generally are fictitious and not 
applicable to real life. Regardless, to the extent graphic depictions of human deaths desensitized 
Canaday, it is hard to fathom how being desensitized would make her less hostile to State-
inflicted killing. Her desensitization to killing would be a minus, not a plus, for Dunlap. Being 
desensitized to the killing of humans makes her more likely to vote for an execution, not less.7 
None of these statements provide a strategic reason for choosing to leave an ADP venire member 
on the jury. 
Third and most significantly, the State entirely failed to address the state:aents by 
Canaday that evidenced a closed mind in favor of automatically imposing death. As set forth in 
Dunlap's Brief Canaday was only open-minded (i.e., capable of following her oath) ·'to a point," 
and that point was her own '·rules and absolutes." Her "rules and absolutes" comprised 
overwhelming support for the death penalty, including the beliefs that life without parole was not 
a harsh enough punishment for murder, that understanding the facts and circumstances of a 
7 The State also offers Canaday's statement that it was "difficult" to know how she would feel 
about making the death penalty decision, because she had not "had to live ... out ... [her] beliefs 
before." See State's Brief at 30. This statement offers no real insight into Canaday's beliefs. It 
merely reflects the truism that never having previously participated in a death penalty decision 
she couldn't know how she would feel, because she had no prior experience to inform her. 
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murder was not important, and that not executing murderers was disrespectful to victims. In 
addition to being predisposed and automatically in favor of death, she was a person who "sticks 
to her own views'' and was not swayed by others. See generally Dunlap's Brief at 25-27. 
The State suggested that Canaday's beliefs were irrelevant, so long as she could set them 
aside, consider the evidence and follow the court's instructions. State's Brief at 30-31. 
However, Canaday never said she could be open-minded and set her beliefs aside. To the 
contrary, she said she was only open-minded "to a point," that point was her "own set of rules 
and absolutes;' and she '·pretty much stick[ s] with [her] own" views. R. 1795-97. Unable to say 
she could set aside her own absolutes and rules, Canaday was actually biased and automatically 
in favor of the death penalty, notwithstanding her willingness to "try hard to be fair." R. 1796. 
See, e.g., Hughes v. United States, 258 F.3d at 460-61; Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray. 248 F.3d 
621,624. 626-27 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.). 
The only other statements the State relied upon to argue Canaday was not Morgan 
impaired are her asse11ions that her decision to impose the death penalty would be based ·'on the 
facts and law in the case;' State's Brid'at 28, that she believed she could be "fair," and that she 
would listen to the evidence. Id. at 30. These assertions are nothing more than the dogmatic 
answers to "general fairness and ·follow the law' questions" that Morgan held were insufficient 
to "detect those jurors with views preventing or substantially impairing their duties in accordance 
with their instructions and oath.'' See Morgan. 504 U.S. at 734-35. ADP jurors like Canaday 
''by definition are ones who cannot perform their duties in accordance with law, their 
protestations to the contrary notwithstanding." Id. at 735. 
Canaday' s statements that she would follow the law and the court's instructions do not 
negate her obvious impairment. "As to general questions of fairness and impartiality, such 
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[ADP] jurors could in all truth and candor respond affirmatively, personally confident that such 
dogmatic views are fair and impartial, while leaving the specific concern unprobed." Id. "Any 
juror who would impose death regardless of the facts and circumstances of conviction cannot 
follow the dictates of law ... It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold 
the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would 
prevent him or her from doing so." Id. at 735-36. 
The State also failed to respond to Dunlap's point that Canaday rejected each of the 
"clarifications that 'saved' the ADP juror" in Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 438-39 (6th Cir. 
2010). See Dunlap's Brief at 26-27. Unlike cases cited by the State where challenged jurors 
who supported the death penalty promised to follow the law and consider mitigation, State's 
Brief at 29, Canaday's statements established that her own "rules and absolutes" did not allow 
her to give effect to mitigation. She believed that life without parole was not a harsh enough 
penalty for murder. Upon conviction for murder, Canaday was a juror who would automatically 
impose death regardless of the facts in mitigation. 
The State failed to even address these points, much less rebut them. Effectively, the State 
has conceded them. This Court should reverse and remand for a new sentencing before an 
unbiased jury. 
D. McMinton was Wrongly Excluded For Cause 
The State contended that McMinton was properly excluded for cause, no Witherspoon 
violation occun-ed and therefore the SAPD was not ineffective in failing to raise the improper 
exclusion ofMcMinton on appeal. State's Brief at 20-26. The State acknowledged McMinton's 
willingness to give the death penalty and her general support for "an eye for an eye" philosophy. 
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Id. at 20. In suggesting that the trial court properly excluded McMinton under Witherspoon 
based on her unwillingness to give death to mentally ill murderers, id. at 25, the State ened. 
1. Deficient Performance in the SAPD's Claim Selection 
The State argued that Dunlap failed to establish deficient performance because the SAPD 
made a reasonable tactical decision in choosing to omit the issues that Dunlap has raised as the 
basis for his appellate ineffectiveness claims.8 State's Brief at 22-23. The SAPD's so-called 
"tactical decision," in choosing not to contest McMinton's exclusion and instead challenging the 
"disqualification of two other jurors for cause" in the appeal, id. at 22-23, did not excuse the 
deficient performance by appellate counsel. 
The issue raised on appeal by the SAPD was without merit, in contrast to the McMinton-
related Witherspoon claim. The State asserted that the SAPD's decision to raise on appeal the 
claim challenging the two jurors, but omit a claim about McMinton, reflected a "tactical decision 
to raise other claims on appeal that may have a greater chance of success." Id. at 23. This 
claimed tactical decision has previously been addressed here and in Dunlap's opening brief. The 
claim raised by the SAPD was the one foreclosed under Ross v. Oklahoma. See Dunlap's Brief 
at 14, 23; see supra at 3-5. Raising a clearly weaker claim on appeal and omitting a clearly 
stronger claim is not a reasonable tactical decision and constitutes deficient performance by 
appellate counsel. See supra at 4-5. See generally Dunlap's Brief at 4-6 (citing appellate IAC 
cases and standards). 
8 The State contended that the SAPD raised a claim similar to Dunlap's Witherspoon claim in 
the post-conviction proceeding, intimating that the later omission on appeal was strategic. 
State's Brief at 22. That claim was framed as an IAC claim, however. The "similar" claim 
related only to trial counsel's failure to object to the prosecution's motion to strike McMinton for 
cause and for not rehabilitating her. See R. (#37270) 802-03. 
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2. Prejudice from Omitting Witherspoon Claim 
As to prejudice from the SAPD's deficient performance, the State's assertion that Dunlap 
cannot show prejudice is also wrong. See State's Brief at 25. A Witherspoon violation occtmed, 
contrary to the State's assertion. Even though the trial court denied an opportunity for 
rehabilitation and clarification when it abruptly terminated McMinton's voir dire, her strong 
statements on the effect of a capital defendant's mental health problems on her sentencing 
decision do not justify excusing her for cause. A prospective juror may be excluded for cause 
only if her views on capital punishment would "prevent or substantially impair the performance 
of [her] duties as a juror in accordance with [her] instructions and [her] oath." Gray v. 
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658 (1987). "[J]urors - whether they be unalterably in favor of, or 
opposed to, the death penalty in every case - by definition are ones who cannot perform their 
duties in accordance with law, their protestations to the contrary notwithstanding." Morgan, 504 
U.S. at 735. Plainly, McMinton was not opposed to the death penalty in every case. 
Accordingly, she was not Witherspoon excludable. 
The Idaho capital sentencing statute requires jurors to find an aggravating circumstance 
in order to make the defendant eligible for a death sentence. LC. § l 9-25 l 5(3)(b ). If an 
aggravating circumstance is proved, the death penalty "shall" be imposed "unless mitigating 
circumstances which may be presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death 
penalty would be unjust." Id. If an aggravating circumstance is found, then each juror is 
instructed to: 
[ d]ecide for yourself whether all mitigating circumstances presented, when 
weighed against each statutory aggravating circumstance proven by the State, are 
sufficiently compelling to make the imposition of the death penalty unjust. ... 
You must each decide for yourself whether mitigating circumstances exist and, if 
so, then consider them in your individual weighing process. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF-14 
R. (#32773, Aug. Vol. 1) 21. See also I.C. § 19-2515(7)(b). 
This instruction illustrates the bifurcated process of the eligibility and selection phases of 
capital sentencing procedures. Eligibility for a capital sentence is determined at the statutory 
narrowing phase by determining the existence of an aggravating circumstance unanimously and 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See I.C.§ l 9-2515(3)(b). Selection of the death penalty by the jury 
requires that it unanimously agree that death should be imposed. Id. Selection of this 
punishment follows only after each individual juror considers whether the "mitigating 
circumstances which may be presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death 
penalty would be unjust." Id. If any single juror found that the presented mitigating 
circumstances were sufficiently compelling to make death unjust, the jury cannot be unanimous 
and cannot agree to impose death. A sentence of life without parole would necessarily result. 
See I.C. § 19-2515(7)(b). The decision whether or not death is unjust remains with each juror in 
their own personal discretion and exercise of moral judgment. See R. (#32773, Aug. Vol. 1) 21. 
Cf 1\1organ, 504 U.S. at 732 n.6 (after consideration of all relevant evidence, jurors deciding 
whether to impose the death penalty under Illinois's "balancing approach" statute -- which is 
much like Idaho's statute -- have considerable discretion, and Witherspoon's general principles 
apply more strongly under such statutory schemes). 
McMinton was not substantially impaired in her ability to follow the instructions and her 
oath at either the eligibility or selection phases of the capital sentencing proceedings. Despite 
McMinton's clear statements to the effect that she was "an eye for an eye" juror in favor of the 
death penalty for most or all murderers, she was willing to modulate that position in accordance 
with her oath to consider mitigating factors including mental health problems. For McMinton, 
mental health problems were highly mitigating. Her consideration of mental health problems 
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shows that far from being substantially impaired in her ability to follow the instructions and her 
oath, McMinton was able to consider and weigh mental health problems and give effect to this 
most basic of mitigating evidence in considering what sentence to impose. 
McMinton was not substantially impaired in her ability to detennine the aggravating 
circumstances. McMinton's demonstrated support for the death penalty clearly established that 
she was able to follow the instructions and her oath with respect to the factual question regarding 
proof of the existence of an aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. Nothing in the 
questionnaire or her voir dire refuted her ability to impartially reach that decision. Thus, at the 
eligibility stage she plainly was able to follow her oath and the instructions. 
Likewise, McMinton was fully able to follow the instructions and her oath regarding her 
own personal decision about whether any evidence that might be presented was mitigating. She 
personally found evidence of mental problems highly mitigating, but that personal judgment did 
not prevent her from following the instructions or her oath. To the contrary, Instruction 14 
explicitly required her to make that decision "for [her]self." Fmther, after making her own 
personal decision whether mitigating circumstances existed, McMinton was able to exercise her 
own personal judgment, for herself, as the instructions required. She was fully able and willing 
to decide whether the existence of any mitigating circumstances she found to exist made the 
imposition of death unjust in her personal judgment and individual weighing process. The 
exercise of her own discretion in making that moral judgment for herself is precisely what the 
statute and instructions required. McMinton was not substantially impaired in her ability to 
follow the instructions or her oath at the selection phase of the sentencing proceeding. See 
generally Dunlap's Brief at 15-20. 
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The State argued that McMinton is substantially impaired with respect to mitigation 
because she would vote for life in any case where the evidence presented proved that the 
defendant had mental health problems. This flawed argument is based on her answer to the 
leading stake-out question regarding mental health problems. State's Brief at 25. A potential 
juror's answers to leading questions are substantially less persuasive. Answers that "may be 
considered expressions of a lack of impartiality," when "made in response to leading questions" 
are "less persuasive." Young v. Hofbauer, 52 Fed. Appx. 234,240 (6th Cir. 2002). See Miaphy 
v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 801-02 (1975) (disregarding admission of predisposition to convict 
because "[ w ]e cannot attach great significance to this statement, however, in light of the leading 
nature of counsel's questions and the juror's other testimony .... "). 
As seen under the Idaho statute and Instruction 14, determining whether a mitigating 
circumstance exists and whether it makes imposition of death unjust is an entirely individual 
decision made independently by each juror. Those determinations are within a juror's complete 
discretion as an individualized, reasoned and moral determination. Clearly, in considering and 
giving effect to mitigating evidence of mental health problems, McMinton could follow the 
instructions and her oath. Converting McMinton into a Witherspoon-Witt excludable, based on 
her consideration of the_ mitigating evidence and willingness to give it effect in accordance with 
the instructions and her oath, violates Witherspoon and its progeny. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 
U.S. 412,424 (1985) ("a prospective juror may be excused for cause because of his or her views 
on capital punishment" when "the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the 
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath."'). 
McMinton plainly was not "unalterably in favor of, or opposed to, the death penalty in 
every case." See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 735. Taking at face value the words placed in her mouth 
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by the prosecutor's leading stake-out question, she would not be willing to give death to a 
mentally ill defendant at the selection phase. R. 1812. The State elevated this single answer to 
impairment. But that assumes, implausibly and without any foundation in the record, that she 
would accept any hint of mental illness as dispositive. The judge cutoff voir dire of McMinton 
after she responded to the State's leading question, and admonished the defense against further 
questions. R. 1812. Defense counsel then stated that he would "let the Court inquire." The trial 
court declined to inquire further and struck McMinton for cause. Id. 
In any event, the voir dire of McMinton revealed an openness to imposing both life and 
death, depending on the mitigating circumstances that might be presented. She was an impartial 
juror willing and able to give effect to mitigation based on her individual consideration of the 
evidence. That is precisely how the statute in Idaho and the death penalty under the Constitution 
is supposed to work. 
Under long established constitutional law, a juror must be allowed to consider relevant 
mitigating evidence, including mental health problems, in making a reasoned moral decision in 
selecting a punishment. "In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), a majority of the Court 
reaffirmed that a sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to 
consider, any relevant mitigating evidence offered by the defendant as the basis for a sentence 
less than death." Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 318 (1989). "If the sentencer is to make an 
individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty, 'evidence about the 
defendant's background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, 
that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged backgro1,md, or 
to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such 
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excuse."' Id. at 319 (emphasis added) (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538,545 (1987) 
(O'Connor, J., concun-ing)). 
Dunlap does not argue here that the opportunity to present mitigating evidence to the jury 
was restricted in violation of the above principles.9 Even assuming unrestricted presentation of 
mitigating evidence, the problem in this case was that a juror willing to give weight to a 
particular mitigating factor was improperly excluded. 
The sentencer must "be able to give effect to the evidence in imposing sentence," and 
"[ o ]nly then can we be sure that the sentencer has treated the defendant as a 'uniquely individual 
human bein[g]' and has made a reliable determination that death is the appropriate sentence." 
Penry, 492 U.S. at 319 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,304,305 (1976)). 
'"Thus, the sentence imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the 
defendant's background, character and crime."' Penry, 419 U.S. at 319 (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Brown, 479 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., concmTing)). See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 304, 306 (1987). 
A juror must be allowed to respond to evidence of mental illness, substance abuse and a 
troubled childhood "in a reasoned, moral manner and to weigh such evidence in [her] calculus of 
deciding whether a defendant is truly deserving of death." Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 
296 (2007). "The sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating 
evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their 
consideration." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15. 
9 The SAPD raised such challenges in the prior appeal. Dunlap is not disagreeing with or 
waiving those prior arguments. 
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Mental illness is one of the most powerful mi ti gators in capital sentencing proceedings. 
See Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1201 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting "the crucial mitigating role 
that evidence of ... mental health problems can have in the sentencing phase" of a capital case 
(internal quotation omitted)); cf Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 1034-35 (2010) (un-presented 
"mental and psychological impairments" helped provide prejudice for an inadequate mitigation 
investigation); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40, 42-43 (2009) (failure to uncover and 
present evidence of "mental health or mental impairment" was deficient performance and it was 
prejudicial not to present jury with evidence of "brain abnormality and cognitive defects"). In 
excluding McMinton because she would give effect to one of the most powerful mitigators, 
mental illness, the trial court ened in finding her substantially impaired in her ability to follow 
the instructions or obey her oath. 
Under the Idaho statute and a long line of case law, McMinton was entitled to 
individually consider and give the weight she thought was proper to mitigating evidence of 
mental illness. She was able to follow the law, vote for both life and death, consider and give 
effect to the mitigating and aggravating evidence, and was not i1Tevocably committed to a 
decision before hearing the evidence. See State's Brief at 30-31 (citing Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 
522 n. 21, and acknowledging that the "most that can be demanded" of a potential juror is the 
ability to consider both life and death sentences and "not be irrevocably committed, before the 
trial has begun," for or against the death penalty "regardless of the facts and circumstances that 
might emerge in the course of the proceeding") (internal quotations omitted). Under Morgan 
and Witherspoon, McMinton was not impaired. 
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After McMinton responded to the prosecutor's leading question by noting that she could 
not give death if there were "evidence of any sort of mental problems," 10 the trial judge ended 
fmiher questioning of her and dismissed her for cause. R. 1812. McMinton brought up the topic 
of mental problems because she was familiar with a serious mental illness, paranoid 
schizophrenia, from which her step-sister suffered. R. 1810, 1812. The State's leading and 
improper stake-out question lumped all mental illness together as one item, no matter how trivial 
or severe, though it was clear McMinton's frame of reference was a serious and debilitating fom1 
of mental illness, paranoid schizophrenia. 
The State suggested that it is a "mystery" how McMinton could have been rehabilitated 
given her answers and the time limits 11 imposed by the comi. State's Brief at 25. However, a 
competent attorney would have examined McMinton about her frame of reference. With this in 
mind, counsel could have distinguished within a very few questions that McMinton likely 
viewed less serious mental health problems, like minor depression or obsessive compulsive 
disorder, differently than paranoid schizophrenia. An examination would also have inquired into 
whether she could consider the evidence of mental health problems, weigh them against 
Dunlap's crime, and come to different life or death sentencing decisions depending on the 
10 This was an improper stake-out question. See United States v. Fell, 372 F.Supp.2d 766, 770-
71 (D. Vt. 2005); United States v. Johnson, 366 F.Supp.2d 822, 842-43, 845 (N.D. Iowa 2005); 
State v. Prince, 266 Ariz. 516,529,250 P.3d 1145, 1158 (Ariz. 2011) (en bane). 
11 To the extent that the time limit entered into the decision to cease questioning ofMcMinton, 
defense counsel's ability to rehabilitate and adequately voir dire a qualified juror was 
nevertheless impeded. "Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove 
prospective jurors who will not be able impmiially to follow the comi' s instructions and evaluate 
the evidence cannot be fulfilled." Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729-30. See Thompson, 248 F.3d at 624-
25 (when juror said only that she would "try to be fair," trial judge "should have followed up" by 
asking "whether she would follow his instructions on the law and suspend judgment until she 
had heard all the evidence"). 
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severity of the mental health problem. McMinton's statement was not a complicated issue and 
could have been handled straightforwardly. 
The State also argued that the trial judge's decision to excuse McMinton was entitled to 
deference because he had observed her demeanor and credibility. Id. at 26. However, 
McMinton was not deceptive in the least; rather she was forthright and open. She acknowledged 
both her support for the death penalty and that she valued mitigation evidence regarding a 
defendant's mental health problems. Nobody questioned her credibility. See R. 1812 (trial comi 
states simply that "she is taken really in on this mental problems"). Her answers were 
unambiguous and clear and her truthfulness or credibility are not at issue. See Thompson, 248 
F.3d at 624-25 (declining to defer to trial judge's ruling on challenge for cause in pmi because 
"no issue of credibility [was] presented" and there was "no argument that [potential juror] was 
not telling the truth"). This is the kind of "clear case" referenced by the State, State's Brief at 26, 
when the need to defer to the trial judge's ability to observe the juror's manner of testifying is 
unnecessary. See, e.g., Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 427-28 (6th Cir. 2006) (cold record 
was so persuasive and clear that it outweighed presumptive deference to the trial judge). 
In conclusion, McMinton was an unbiased potential juror who was erroneously excused 
for cause in violation of Witherspoon, Witt and Morgan. Such an erroneous exclusion 
invalidates the sentence and is never hmmless. Accordingly, the sentence must be reversed. 
E. If McMinton was Substantially Impaired Under Witherspoon-Witt, then 
Numerous Other Jurors were Substantially Impaired Under Morgan 
Many of the jurors that Dunlap argued were impaired under Morgan share an impairment 
with regard to some kind of basic mitigating evidence. See Dunlap's Brief at 24-36. Some, like 
Canaday, Craig Crandall and Lonnie Taggart, expressed their ADP views fairly explicitly, such 
as their belief that life without parole was not a harsh enough penalty for murder. Id. at 24-29. 
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Others, like Corey Kunz and Mat Gronning, appeared to favor death in all instances of first 
degree murder and would consider life only for lesser degrees of murder where there was some 
defense to the crime. Id. at 29-32. The State attacked Dunlap's characterization of the jurors, 
one by one. Id. at 26-40. Having already replied regarding Canaday's substantial impairment, 
Dunlap stands on his opening brief as to jurors Crandall, Taggart, Kunz and Gronning, who were 
openly ADP. 
Many of the jurors also expressed attitudes that precluded them from giving effect to a 
defendant's difficult childhood, a particular category of classically mitigating evidence, or were 
predisposed in favor of an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 32-36. As to those jurors, Dunlap 
offers this rebuttal to the State's challenges. Seven jurors agreed that it "doesn't matter what 
kind of childhood a murderer had." See id. at 32-35. Five jurors agreed that "someone already 
convicted of murder is likely to kill someone else." See id. at 35-36. Dunlap argued that these 
jurors were substantially impaired in their ability to consider and give effect to a defendant's 
difficult childhood and to decide impaiiially the aggravating circumstance of propensity to 
commit murder. Id. at 32-26. 
The State argued that seeking to disqualify jurors based on these questionnaire responses, 
especially when mitigation had not been defined, is "preposterous." State's Brief at 35 n.5. For 
the reasons that follow, the State is wrong. First, the State's position is self-contradictory. The 
State itself defended in its brief the dismissal for cause of McMinton, based on a substantial 
impairment in her ability give death when mental illness is present and despite her pre-
disposition toward death generally. Like all the venire members in voir dire, McMinton did not 
receive a definition of mitigation. Disqualification for a substantial impairment in a juror's 
ability to follow the instructions and her oath ( and consider and give effect to mitigation) does 
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not require that mitigation be defined during voir dire. 12 Second, in attempting to uphold the 
stake-out and disqualification of juror McMinton, based on her feelings about a particular kind of 
mitigating evidence, mental illness, id. at 25-26, the State ignores the logical congruity that 
would make similar statements by other jurors equally disqualifying. Thus, if McMinton's 
willingness to consider and give great weight to a single category of mitigating evidence, mental 
illness, was disqualifying as a substantial impairment, then other jurors' unwillingness to 
consider another category of mitigation, a defendant's difficult childhood, must be equally 
disqualifying. 
If a venire member who is willing to consider death can be disqualified because a 
particular category of mitigation is so persuasive to her that she would give life if that mitigation 
were sufficiently present, then other venire members should likewise be disqualified, despite 
claims that they will consider a life sentence and mitigating evidence in general, when they 
disregard as irrelevant an entire category of mitigation. The statement "it doesn't matter to me" 
indicates a categorical rejection of evidence of a defendant's childhood. It is not simply a 
decision to give such evidence little weight, but to exclude it from consideration and give it no 
weight at all. 
In Eddings, the Supreme Comt evaluated a case involving a youthful, emotionally 
disturbed defendant with a difficult family history and childhood. 455 U.S. at 114-16. The 
Court stated that "the sentencer" may not "refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 
mitigating evidence." Id. at 114 (emphasis in original). "The sentencer ... may determine the 
12 If a definition of mitigation is required, then that is a shortcoming demonstrating further error 
in the disqualification of McMinton. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 24 
weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by 
excluding such evidence from their consideration." Id. at 114-15 ( emphasis added). 
Jurors who disregarded a defendant's childhood in advance of the trial, because "it didn't 
matter," were substantially impaired. Their answer indicated they essentially deemed this 
classically mitigating category of evidence inelevant. They failed to consider it and discarded it 
as a distraction unworthy of consideration. While they might be entitled to assign it little or no 
weight after hearing and considering the evidence but being unimpressed, see, e.g., Copenhefer 
v. Horn, 696 F .3d 3 77, 3 86-87 (3rd Cir. 2012), they may not disregard it in advance. See United 
States v. Sampson, 335 F.Supp.2d 166,229 (D. Mass. 2004) (interpreting Eddings as 
distinguishing between considering relevant mitigating evidence but giving it little or no weight, 
and refusing to consider relevant mitigation and giving it no weight because sentencer did not 
consider the mitigation to be relevant at all). Here, these five jurors in advance of trial excluded 
Dunlap's childhood from their consideration by concluding it "didn't matter" without hearing 
any evidence. In forbidding a sentencer from excluding relevant mitigation from its 
consideration, the Comi stated in Eddings that "Lockett [v. Ohio and the Constitution] requires 
[the juror] to listen." Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114 n. 10. 
In contrast, McMinton plainly was willing to consider and dete1mine the weight of 
mitigating evidence related to a defendant's mental problems. See supra at 15-17, 20. Yet she 
was disqualified precisely for her ability to follow the court's instructions and her oath, her 
willingness to make an individual detennination of the weight of mitigating evidence and in an 
appropriate case, to give life when sufficient evidence was presented on that mitigation, 
notwithstanding her general inclination to favor death. If she was substantially impaired in 
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considering and valuing classic mitigating evidence highly, then the jurors who disregarded a 
defendant's childhood entirely, because "it didn't matter," were also substantially impaired. 
In a similar vein, but with respect to the propensity to commit murder aggravating 
circumstance, five jurors, Canaday among them, should have been disqualified for cause because 
they were substantially impaired as to that aggravating circumstance. Those jurors agreed that 
"someone already convicted of murder is likely to kill someone else." Dunlap's Brief at 35-36. 
Further, they were informed that Dunlap had killed two different women on two different 
occasions. See, e.g., R. 1794. With no examination of these jurors about this answer on the 
questionnaire, the only record evidence indicates an expressed, clear belief with respect to 
predisposition to find a particular aggravating circumstance. Based on the facts they were told 
about Dunlap's prior murders, and believing he was "likely to kill someone else," these jurors 
were predisposed when they applied the court's propensity instruction to find that Dunlap had 
"an affinity toward committing murder" and was a "willing, predisposed killer, a killer who 
tends toward destroying the life of another" and "kills with less than the normal amount of 
provocation." See R. 152. If McMinton was substantially impaired based on her belief that a 
defendant with sufficiently severe mental problems should not be executed, then these five jurors 
were substantially impaired by their belief that a convicted murderer was likely to kill again. 
For these additional reasons numerous jurors were substantially impaired under Morgan. 
Dunlap is entitled to reversal of the district court decision, the grant of post-conviction relief and 
a new sentencing proceeding. 
F. Trial Counsel Were Ineffective at Voir Dire 
In a separate section of its brief, the State again asserted the limited time for voir dire as a 
defense and excuse for trial counsel's inability to adequately explore attitudes of the venire 
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members about the death penalty and their ability to follow the instructions and their oaths. 
State's Brief at 41. As before, the limited time for an adequate voir dire presents its own 
constitutional problem. To the extent time constraints limited voir dire, sometimes without 
opportunities for necessary rehabilitation, see, e.g., R. 1813, those constraints may be relevant to 
and intertwined with other claims. See Dunlap V, 155 Idaho at 363-64, 313 P.3d at 19-20. See 
supra at 21 and n. 11. Further, trial counsel should have objected to the time limits, when "red 
flag" answers in questionnaires or voir dire existed, and trial counsel had not been able to 
address them in the limited time. Regardless, trial counsel's failure to use the limited time for 
inquiries, motions and objections relevant to capital juror qualification was neve11heless 
ineffective. 
This leads to the State's mischaracterization of the record and Dunlap's Briefregarding 
the wasted time by trial counsel during voir dire. The State suggested that Dunlap made only a 
"conclusory" argument on this point, "generally not supp01ied with any facts or citation to the 
record," and therefore this Comi should disregard Dunlap's argument. State's Brief at 42 
(criticizing Dunlap's Brief at 38). However, on the very page cited by the State as devoid of 
citations to facts or the record, Dunlap cited specific instances of wasted, i1Televant voir dire 
questions and exchanges regarding "the Super Bowl, a juror's ranch and amount of snow there, 
and the Simpson's and other t.v. shows." Dunlap's Brief at 38 (citing R. 1736, 1747-50, 1762). 
The State argued that Dunlap ignored matters of demeanor. The State relied heavily on 
demeanor, but the trial court never mentioned demeanor, nor expressed any concerns about 
ambiguity in McMinton's testimony or her credibility. When credibility is not at issue and the 
statements at issue are plain and unambiguous, demeanor is of little moment. See supra at 22, 
citing Thompson, 248 F.3d at 624-25, Franklin, 434 F.3d at 427-28. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 27 
This leaves tactics and strategy as the State's main defense to trial counsel's inadequate 
voir dire. State's Brief at 41. The State asserted that cases cited by Dunlap regarding instances 
of trial IAC during voir dire were inapplicable, not for the truth of the general principle 
contained therein, but because the facts were distinguishable. State's Brief at 42-43. However, 
the fundamental principle applies here, even if the facts of those cases are different from the case 
at bar: there is no reasonable tactical or strategic decision for leaving a biased juror on the jury, 
and it is ineffective to do so. See Hughes, 258 F.3d at 462-63. In this case,juror Canaday most 
clearly was biased and an ADP juror. 13 Other jurors were also substantially impaired in the 
ability to follow the instructions and their oath. The seating of those jurors was a result of trial 
counsel's ineffectiveness and was neither strategic nor ham1less, Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 
632-33 (Mo. 2002) (en bane), as the seating of biased jurors is structural en-or that establishes 
prejudice. See Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729. 
In failing to raise this clearly stronger issue of trial IAC for an inadequate voir dire, 
appellate counsel was ineffective. The State argued yet again that the SAPD made a tactical 
decision to omit this issue in favor of "more viable claims." State's Brief at 43. As with the 
other issues, the SAPD's decision to raise the issue foreclosed by Ross v. Oklahoma was a 
clearly weaker claim and resulted in deficient perfonnance. Prejudice from the appellate 
ineffectiveness flows directly from the clear ineffectiveness of trial counsel on the underlying 
claim. 
For this reason, too, Dunlap is entitled to relief. 
13 Trial counsel appeared to realize it, yet made no objection and instead shifted gears to another 
line of inquiry after inten-upting Canaday -- as she was about to explain the extent of her views 
and the personal absolute and rules that she "stick[ s] with" -- and asking "is there any other 
reason that you can think of that you wouldn't be able to sit on the jury and be fair and impartial 
... ?" R. 1 797 ( emphasis added). 
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III. APPELLATE IAC CLAIMS FOR FAILING TO RAISE INSTRUCTIONAL 
ERRORS ARE MERITORIOUS 
Dunlap stands on his brief regarding the instructional issues and makes no fu1iher 
response other than to note that the ex post facto and due process violations, Dunlap's Brief at 
49-53, were fundamental en-ors and violated his federal constitutional rights. The change in the 
law, referenced in Dunlap's Brief at 51-52, was not harmless. Unless the record makes clear that 
the sentencer "would have imposed the same sentence" under the prior law, an ex post facto 
violation may not be considered harmless. United States v. Sanchez, 549 Fed. Appx. 557,557 
(7th Cir. 2013). See Peugh v. United States,_ U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2088 & n.8 (2013). 
The jury did not make a determination of whether mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances. Id. The record does not establish that the jury would have imposed 
the same sentence under the prior law 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons set fo1ih in this brief and Dunlap's opening brief, this Court should 
reverse the district court decision, grant the petition for post-conviction relief and order that 
Dunlap be re-sentenced before a new jury. 
/ 
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of September, 2014. .·· 
~-
~ 
eresa A. Hampton 
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